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Esta investigação procura avaliar se a motivação para a gestão de inventários explica 
o uso do crédito comercial, bem como se algum efeito de contágio ocorre no crédito 
comercial durante períodos de crise financeira. Desta forma, através de um painel de 
dados referente a empresas industriais Portuguesas de pequena e média dimensão 
que abrangem o período de 2000 a 2009, e utilizando a metodologia de dados em 
painel, os resultados confirmam a existência de um incentive para as empresas 
procurarem e concederem crédito comercial. Este incentivo baseia em primeiro lugar 
na promoção das vendas, e sem segundo lugar, na redução dos inventários e dos 
custos que lhe estão associados. Além disso, as restrições de crédito frequentes em 
períodos de crise financeira leva a que empresas com elevadas contas a receber 
adiem os pagamentos aos fornecedores. Particularmente, empresas com risco 
elevado recebem mais crédito dos seus fornecedores uma vez que estes estão mais 




















This investigation access if an inventory management motivation could explain the 
use trade credit, as well if a trade credit contagion effect occurs during periods of 
financial crisis. Therefore, a panel dataset of Portuguese manufacturing SME firms, 
over the period of 2000-2009, and employing a panel data methodology, the results 
confirm the existence of an incentive for firms to offer and receive trade credit in 
order to promote sales in the first instance, and in a second instance, to reduce 
inventory levels and the associated costs. Moreover, credit constraints during a 
financial crisis cause firms holding high-levels of accounts receivable to postpone 
payments to suppliers. Specifically, high-risk firms receive more suppliers’ credit due 
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When supplier firms deliver goods to their customers, they often do not require to 
be paid immediately. Instead, who is delivering goods offers credit terms upon the 
purchase - accounts receivable (AR) - to who is receiving the goods and have the 
obligation to repay - accounts payable (AP). This practice is called trade credit.  
 
Since trade credit requires two separate transactions - goods for a loan and loan 
for money - to effect what is essentially one exchange - goods for money; suppliers 
effectively finance their customer's purchases with short-term debt. However, this is 
one particular type of short-term loan because, according with Cuñat (2012) it differs 
relatively to other types of corporate debt in three main aspects. First, suppliers 
lend ‘in kind’, not in cash. Second, in contrast with bank loans, trade credit is 
frequently not subject to specific, formal contracts between the lender and the 
borrower. Finally, is issued by non-financial firms. This last feature is the most 
remarkable of this short-term financing source because suggests an intermediary role 
of trade credit (Bukart and Ellingsen, 2004). 
 
Trade credit is a regular component of market transactions, representing an 
average of 8,22% of total assets of United States listed firms between 1992 and 2007 
(Aktas, De Bodt, Lobez & Statnik, 2012). Similar observations have been made about 
firms in Europe as well. Guariglia and Mateut (2006) reported that in the United 
Kingdom, 70% of total short-term debt (credit extended) and 55% of total credit 
received by firms was made up of trade credit.  
 
This dominance of trade credit within the sources of financing in first world 
countries is puzzling and likely to raise questions. By any standard, trade credit it is 
an expensive form of finance because of its implicit cost, which involves the 
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renounced rebate for cash payments that the firm suffers to benefit from payment 
delays (Aktas et al., 2012). In this case, why should a firm that specializes in 
production/sales act as a financial intermediary when specialized intermediaries, 
like banks, provide capital to financially constrained buyers in order to buy goods 
from sellers in goods markets? Why not cut out the middleman? 
 
The literature in economics, finance and operations management has tried to 
provide theoretical explanations for trade credit usage. From these attempts, two 
major theories can be pointed out. Financial theories of trade credit (Meltzer, 1960; 
Schwartz, 1974; Emery, 1984; Smith, 1987; Nilsen, 2002) posit that firms with easy 
and ample access to credit markets finance those with limited access. However, 
these theories focus exclusively on how financial market imperfections, like 
information asymmetry (Biais and Gollier, 1997; Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004), can 
affect the demand of trade credit.  
 
The non-financial theories deal with purely operational considerations for trade 
credit: allows for price discrimination (Brennan, Maksimovic and Zechner, 1988), 
serves as a warranty for product quality (Long, Malitz and Ravid, 1993), fosters long-
term relationship with customers (Wilson and Summers, 2002), and optimize firm's 
cash and inventory management (Ferris, 1981; Emery 1987; Daripa and Nilsen, 2005; 
Bougheas, Mateut and Mizen, 2009). 
 
Since trade credit combines the normal business activity of a firm – 
production/sell of goods - with financial intermediation - delayed payment (a 
function that was traditionally assumed by a financial institution); it allows a link 
between goods and financial markets, that goes further than the comparison of the 
relative costs of alternative forms of finance to firms. 
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Therefore, since the essence of this research arises from a distinctive motivation 
of the financial view of trade credit, relying on a more strategic view of trade credit; 
the present work attempts to assess if an inventory management, in the context of 
the transactions costs theory, exists as a motive for firms to use trade credit; i.e., to 
assess if when firms face product uncertainty, they are incentivized to increase 
overall sales trough the extension of trade credit to financially constrained 
customers, in order to reduce costly inventories, which can take too long time to be 
sold for cash.  
 
Another purpose of this study is to determine if a trade credit contagion effect 
occurs during periods of financial crisis, and how is that affects trade credit policies. 
This latter motivation has arisen from the fact that global economy went, very 
recently, through a financial crisis (2008-09). Thus, once that financial crisis causes 
financial contagion between financial intermediaries, and because of that a trade 
credit contagion in the supply chain may occurs; this topic is then of enormous 
relevance to be studied. 
 
Considering in greater detail the model proposed by Bougheas et al. (2009) and 
Bastos and Pindado (2013), this investigation employs a panel data methodology to 
test for Portuguese SME firms the response of accounts payable and accounts 
receivable, proxies to trade credit demand and supply, respectively; to changes in 
the cost of inventories, profitability, risk profile, liquidity position and bank finance 
access; and to financial crisis, when a credit contagion effect occurs on trade credit 
channel. The sample, extracted from SABI (Iberian Balance sheet Analysis System), 
covers a ten years period, ranging since 2000 until 2009. 
 
This is a distinctive study because in a first instance, it relies on a literature 
stream that frequently do not explores inventory transactions costs as a motive for 
offering trade credit. The few studies on this area are mainly the ones from Emery 
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(1987), Daripa and Nilsen (2005), Bougheas et al. (2009), and Mateut, Mizen and 
Ziane (2011). Moreover, to our knowledge, this is the first study to address the 
reason for inventory management in Portuguese firms. 
 
As already mentioned, the sample in analysis regard Portuguese firms. Ferrando 
and Mullier (2013) using observations from 8 euro area countries in the period 1993-
2009, showed that trade credit channel was a major element of corporate finance for 
firms located in Mediterranean countries, such as Italy, Spain and Portugal, to which 
trade credit channel represented 51%, 45% and 44% of the firm's total assets, 
respectively. Specifically to Portuguese firms, they show that in general, accounts 
receivable are higher than accounts payable. In the last year of the study (2009), 
accounts receivable were almost 30% of total assets, and accounts payable exceeded 
slightly more than 15% of total assets. 
 
Finally, the SME’s firms are the study focus since they are predominant in 
corporate structure of the Portuguese industrial sectors and widely recognized as the 
mainstay of the national economy. In 2008, there were 349.756 micro, small and 
medium enterprises in Portugal, representing 99,7% of the non-financial corporate 
sector, which were responsible for 72,5% of employment in companies in the non-
financial sector and for 57.9% of turnover (INE, 2010). Moreover, according with 
Ferrando and Mulier (2013) results, within the group of countries studied, Portugal 
was the second country with the highest percentage of small firms (91%), in the 
universe of firms studied, i.e., small, medium and large. 
 
Two main results were observed from the tests to predictions of the study. First, 
in line with Bougheas et al. (2009), inventories have direct influence on both 
accounts payable and receivable, even after controlling for firm's characteristics.  
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This confirms the existence of an inventory management purpose for Portuguese 
SME firms in providing credit to their customers. Second, in concordance with Bastos 
and Pindado (2013), during financial crisis a cascade trade credit contagion in the 
supply chain arise, increasing consequently the use of trade credit. Specifically, high-
risk firms receive more suppliers’ credit due to suppliers concern about their 
customer's survival. 
 
The study is structured in the following way. The next section presents an 
overview about trade credit literature. The third section describes the theory and 
research hypotheses. Data, empirical model and method are presented in section 
four. The fifth section present and discuss the results concerning the response of 
accounts receivable and payable to changes in the cost of inventories, profitability, 
risk, liquidity, bank debt, and to the occurrence of a credit contagion effect during 





2. Literature review 
 
There has been a long debate in the literature about the motives that suppliers 
and customers face in offering or receiving trade credit. Theoretical studies on trade 
credit developed different models not necessarily mutually exclusive directions to 
explain the existence of trade credit (e.g., Long et al., 1993). But the most 
inconclusive question is why non-financial firms (i.e., suppliers) participate in the 
financial intermediation process by extending trade credit (i.e., to customers), when 
there are specialized financial intermediaries, such as commercial banks. 
 
The literature appoints two distinct motives to justify the delay of payment in 
transaction of goods: (i) Financial and, (ii) Transaction Motivations.  More recent 
Schiozer and Brando (2011) provides three hypotheses to justify the use of trade 
credit: (i) Trade credit as a substitute to bank loans; (ii) trade credit as complement 
to bank loans and, (iii) trade credit as a strategic instrument for the agents (i.e., 
suppliers and customers).  
 
Next, we summarise these three strands of the literature, combining it with early 
classifications. Thus, the first two hypotheses relate to financial motivations, while 
the latter is related to the transaction motives. 
 
2.1. Financial motivations 
There is significant relationship between two primary sources of financing firm’s 
current activities: trade credit and bank credit. Beside the high implicit interest rate 
that firm suffers to not benefit from payment delays associated the renounced 
rebate for cash payments, customers prefer to increase liabilities to suppliers of 
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goods and services, instead of taking a lower interest rate charged by financial 
institutions for working capital loans (Aktas et al., 2012). 
 
This puzzling choice, according to Atanasova (2007) can be justified by two lines 
of research within financial motivations: (i) a demand effect that implies firms to use 
trade credit because they are denied access to institutional finance, and (ii) a supply 
effect, that assume trade credit granted by suppliers as a facilitator way to access to 
institutional loans. 
 
The first line of research mentioned was firstly raised by Meltzer (1960) and is 
known as SUBSTITUTION HYPOTHESIS. From a macroeconomic point of view, he 
suggested that exists a trade credit channel that mitigates restrictions in obtaining 
conventional bank lending by firms discriminated by monetary restriction policy, - 
traditionally small businesses. In turn, large companies use their ability to access the 
capital markets to extend financial support to customers in this situation. 
 
In the same point of view, recently Nilsen (2002) claims that when monetary 
authorities are conducting a restrictive policy, particularly in periods of recession, 
the supply of external finance may decrease significantly, such that a sufficient 
allocation of funds to all demanding borrowers may no longer be possible, creating 
the need for alternative channels to manage growth. Therefore, trade credit is a 
substitutable form of bank financing available not only for big companies but also 
virtually the only source of alternative funding for small firms. 
 
However, a more pure financial perspective than that Meltzer (1960) explains the 
role of trade credit is due to the existence of market imperfections. Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981) show that due to unequal access to information about borrowers 
defaults risk - information asymmetry - creditworthy borrowers are difficult to 
identify. Therefore, being unable to charge to each customer an interest rate that is 
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appropriate to its risk class, financial institutions face an adverse selection problem, 
which forces them to rationing credit. As a result, some borrowers that have excess 
bank credit demand are forced to use other alternative sources of financing. 
 
In this context, Schwartz  (1974) examined the financial motive as a response to 
credit rationing, which does not have a homogeneous effect across firms. For this 
reason, trade credit flows primarily from companies that have easier access to 
capital markets - it specifies as the more liquid firms, usually large firms-, that act as 
financial intermediaries, utilizing their borrowing capacity in order to channel more 
of their monetary resource, to those that have difficulties to access them - again he 
specifies as the less liquid firms (i.e., small firms). 
 
Emery (1984) analysed the financial market imperfections, focusing purely on 
financial intermediation motive. He argues that capital market imperfections require 
selling firms to maintain adequate liquid reserves, which they can invest in 
marketable securities or lend out through trade investments. Smith (1987), focusing 
on informational asymmetry present in financial markets, showed that the terms of 
trade credit act as a signal. Through the establishment of high implicit interest rates, 
creditors can obtain private and high value information about debtor risk of default. 
 
At this point, market imperfections provide an excellent basis for trade credit. 
Once that customer’s of product markets are more homogeneous than in financial 
markets, the extension of trade credit involves a supplier’s cost advantage over third 
party intermediaries (Emery, 1984) that allows them to offer trade credit at an 
implicit interest rate that is lower than the purchaser could obtain elsewhere. 
 
According to Emery (1987), the information costs include the search costs, which 
is inexistent because borrowers are already customers; and the cost of assessing and 
monitoring default risk, which due to the frequency of interactions and contacts 
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implicit on the selling process (Petersen and Rajan, 1997), enables suppliers to 
monitor the business and assess the creditworthiness, not only at a lower cost, but 
also in a timely manner. 
 
Collection costs are other advantage of supplier firms over financial 
intermediaries (Emery, 1984). A more recent explanation of this cost advantage in 
achieving the credits was given on Frank and Maksimovic (2005), where they relate 
the use of trade credit with legal ability of creditors to repossess goods as collateral 
in a scenario of bankruptcy. Once that inputs sold on credit can provide collateral to 
suppliers, in case of customers do not pay, suppliers are in better position than 
financial institutions to repossess and liquidate those assets, in order to recoup the 
full value of goods; because the seller is in the industry, having established a sales 
network and own distribution channels that allows them to redirect the goods to its 
other customers, while a bank has no such network (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). 
 
Enforcement advantage is another advantage listed in the literature and is related 
with threaten power of the suppliers. If supplier’s products constitute a large share 
in the buyer’s sales, the risk of interruption in the supply of an essential input is 
more fatal than the risk of losing future access to the financial market, thus 
according to Petersen and Rajan (1997), the likelihood to buyer's failure a payment 
on a trade credit loan is lower than a market loan. Later, Cuñat (2007) argued that 
not only customers are more willing to repay their suppliers, but also suppliers will 
effectively provide liquidity, through debts forgiven and extension of maturity period 
of credit, in order to increase the survival chances of their customer when these 
experience temporary liquidity shocks. These results establish trade credit as type of 
insurance. 
 
The second line of research mentioned is known as the COMPLEMENTARY 
HYPOTHESIS, and argues that bank credit is typical long-term in origin while trade 
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credit mostly is short-term (e.g., Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004). Since firms need 
short-term and long-term credit as well, both types of credit are complementary 
rather than substitutable. 
 
Biais and Gollier (1997) article was pioneer in the analysis of the dynamic and 
complementary relationship existing between trade credit and bank credit. Their 
model emphasizes the different signals that banks and suppliers have about 
borrower’s creditworthiness. Since accounts payable reveals supplier’s unique and 
private information and act as a valuable and positive sign about a firm's quality, 
firms that cannot initially access bank debt may actually enhance their subsequent 
access to bank debt because banks, observing the use of trade credit, update their 
beliefs about a customer default risk and, therefore, are better positioned to identify 
healthy investment opportunities. 
 
More recently, Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) show the supplier’s informational 
advantage was linked to the input transaction itself. In their model, trade credit 
usage increases the investment size, increasing consequently the residual return; 
however, unlike banks suppliers are less concerned with resource diversion by their 
customers because they borrow goods instead of money. Thus, they argue that due to 
the illiquidity of inputs, moral hazard risk that is in the basis of resource diversion 
problem can be reduced. Firms financing their current activity with trade credit 
assume, in the presence of imperfect financial markets, a credible commitment not 
to divert, and then, as a consequence, banks are willing to increase their lending to 
that customer. 
 
2.2. Transaction motivations 
The theories about financial motivations explains the existence of trade credit, 
but these arguments still not be sufficient to explain the existence of a trade credit 
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channel. For example, why small suppliers offer trade credit? Or on the other hand, 
why large buyers often take trade credit? Why trade credit terms vary between 
customers and industries?  
 
To answer these questions, literature also provides non-financial motives that 
consider that the trade credit involves purely operational considerations for 
transactions (Ferris, 1981). From the existing literature, four main transaction 
motives can thus be established for trade credit usage: (i) allow firms to practice 
price discrimination, (ii) offers implicit quality guarantees, (iii) promote long-term 
relationship with customers, and (iv) minimize transaction costs.  
 
The underlying hypothesis about price discrimination was for the first time 
analysed by Meltzer (1960), who found that through the increase and decrease of the 
extent of average collection periods – administered prices -; firms are able to 
increase overall sales and obtain liquidity during periods of tight monetary policy. 
This theory assumes that, although buyer heterogeneity should imply sellers to 
charge different prices to different customers but antitrust laws forbid direct price 
discrimination. In this context, Brennan et al. (1988) show that in the imperfectly 
competitive industries, upstream firms in production channel are able to offer trade 
credit as a so-called premium on risky customers. Offering different trade credit 
terms between customers paying in cash and using credit, firms can reduce the 
effective price to low-quality borrowers – typically credit rationed. 
 
The literature also stresses out the role of trade credit as an effective warranty 
for product quality. According with Long et al. (1993), due to asymmetric 
information, firms without reputation or whose products are not well known in the 
product market, extend trade credit to signal the firm's quality control efforts. Thus, 
sellers are willing to bear the cost of financing customer's purchases until the time 
they can attest the quality of goods for themselves. 
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The capitalization of benefits coming from long-term supplier/buyer relationships, 
as part of a long-term strategy; is another line of research within the transaction 
motive. According with Wilson and Summers (2002), if a seller have made specific 
investments in the buyer-seller relationship (either in physical or relationship terms), 
then it is in their economic interest to act to maintain the buyer in business so long 
as sufficient future returns are anticipated. Consequently the supplier will be more 
willing to extend credit (as a short-term loss), if they can perceive benefits of: (i) 
capturing and retaining new business, and (ii) future income stream originated by the 
long-term commitment to the market/customer, i.e., from the implicit equity stake 
in the customer business. 
 
Finally, Ferris (1981) was one of the first to emphasise the importance of trade 
credit in reducing transaction costs between suppliers and their customers, showing 
that trade credit is a cash management tool. In his model, firms have to make 
optimal production decision before demand is realized. Thus, facing high degrees of 
uncertainty with respect to the timing and magnitude of orders, they are forced to 
increase precautionary cash. In this context, the author suggest that by the 
separation of the payment cycle and the delivery cycle, trade credit enables trading 
partners to forewarning the timing of money flows, pooling the trading risk present in 
stochastic money flow. As a consequence, by allowing the accumulation of invoices 
to be paid periodically instead of each moment that goods are delivered, trade credit 
decreases the number of settlements and the associated fixed costs. Moreover, it can 
reduce or eliminate transaction costs derived from situations of uncertainty on trade, 
including the costs associated with carrying/maintaining cash held as precautionary 
motive. 
 
Another version of the theory of transaction costs assumes that when are wide 
instability in the pattern of consumption of the products of a company; in order to 
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maintain smooth production cycles; companies would have to maintain large 
inventories. This behaviour would involve two types of costs: (i) costs of storage, and 
(ii) financing costs to maintain inventories. In order to reduce them, suppliers may 
offer trade credit as an incentive to buyers to hold higher stocks of inventories, 
shifting inventory holding from seller to buyer. 
 
Emery (1987) developed from the purely operational reason, a positive theory of 
trade credit. His results show that by partitioning the inventories costs into its 
operating and financial components through trade credit, the buyer and seller will 
specialize in the respective costs of accommodating variable demand and, 
consequently, perform economies of scale. The buyer incurs the operating cost. 
Because supplier's inventories are passed to buyers, they have to the carry out the 
storage cost, which includes inventory taxes, insurance, and expenditures to prevent 
or repair deterioration of stored goods. This increase on costs is partially but not 
completely offset by paying a lower price for inputs. The seller incurs the financial 
cost, which is related with the opportunity cost of late payment. Because trade 
credit smooth’s demand, the seller's wealth increases via total costs reduction. 
 
The trade-off between inventories and trade credit was recently analysed by 
Daripa and Nilsen (2005). In their model, in the presence of demand uncertainty, the 
final producer decides whether to hold inventory to meet sales or to order supplies 
when final demand for goods arrives. The decision is influenced by the cost of 
holding the inventory, which is not based on storage costs, but on inventory financing 
costs to the final producer firm, which are often realized through bank loans. If their 
suppliers have better credit terms than banks to subsidy inventories, thus suppliers 
will provide trade credit to downstream firms, inducing them to hold the inventories. 
 
Bougheas et al. (2009) tied the inventory management motive for extending trade 
credit with the production decision process of the firm, which derives in the optimal 
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production and sales when subject to uncertain demand. In their model, because of 
uncertainty on the transaction flows, upstream firm, in the middle of a product 
chain; are forced to hold inventories of unsold finished goods, which are held at a 
cost. In this context, the firm faces a trade-off between costly inventories and sales 
on credit. The supplier's willingness to offer trade credit on appropriate terms to 
enhance sales and boost demand rather than accumulate costly inventories of 
finished goods; it is limited by the need to obtain liquidity to meet their obligations. 
This result is especially true for small firms, which face higher storage costs, 
comparatively to large firms, since their capacity to store finished goods is smaller.   
 
This investigation provides an overview of the most relevant studies on trade 





3. Theory and research hypotheses 
 
Since this work attempts to assess if an inventory management, in the context of 
the transactions costs theory, exists as a motive for firms to use trade credit; as well 
if a trade credit contagion effect occurs during periods of financial crisis, and how is 
that affects trade credit policies; in this section are derived testable hypotheses with 
respect to accounts receivable and accounts payable, taking into account the models 
reported by Bougheas et al. (2009) and Bastos and Pindado  (2013). 
 
3.1. Bougheas, Mateut and Mizen (2009) model: An overview 
All firms in production chain finance their production every time they are paid for 
his goods at the moment of delivery. Some times however, firms might deliver the 
goods to their customers down the chain without requiring immediate payment. 
Thus, as Petersen and Rajan (1997) confirmed the use of trade credit of a firm is 
twofold, i.e., a firm that receive trade credit from his supplier will, in turn, extend 
trade credit to its own customers.  
 
Considering an upstream firm in the production chain, that produces and sells 
intermediate goods to a downstream firm; when the production problem is 
deterministic, i.e., when demand is known; their optimal production decision is 
simple once there is no need to keep inventories in reserve for unexpected shocks. 
However, firms frequently make their optimal production decision in an environment 
where the final demand for its products is unknown. The qualitative effect of adding 
a stochastic component to demand require firm's to keep a stock of inventories on 
hand to deal with unexpected shocks. Obviously, all else equal, if there is a long lag 
between the production and the sale of goods, the supplier firm will have to bear out 
the financing cost of keeping unsold goods in inventory, until these are sold. 
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Once the upstream firm accept trade credit from its own suppliers, increasing 
their inventories; the firm clearly faces a trade-off which influences the levels of 
trade credit through two separate effects. First, the called sales motive incentives 
the supplier to sell on credit. Second, through the financial motive of reducing costs, 
trade credit transfers the holding costs of inventories from the supplier to its 
customers. However, the financial motive is a double-edged sword, because it 
encourages the supplier to offer trade credit to further reduce storage costs, but it 
also incentivizes the supplier to limit the amount of trade credit, in order to increase 
the liquid resources of the firm to meet their own obligations, i.e., needs in cash to 
repay its own trade creditors.  
 
3.2. Research Hypotheses 
The hypotheses about the response of accounts payable and receivable to changes 
to the cost of inventories, risk profile, profitability and liquidity position and bank 
loans (Bougheas et al. 2009), will be next established. Then, the behaviour of 
accounts receivable and payable will be analysed under the hypothesis that there is a 
contagion effect on trade credit channel during periods of crisis (Bastos and Pindado, 
2013). 
 
I) INVENTORIES AND TRADE CREDIT 
One of the main variables of interest in use in this study is stock of inventories 
(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠). Although have not been used as explanatory variable in empirical studies 
many often, it will allow focusing the cost reduction due to reduced inventories, i.e., 
on how trade credit can be used for inventory management purposes (e.g., Emery, 
1987; Daripa and Nilsen, 2005). 
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According to this motive, firms that accumulate large inventories of finished goods 
face high inventory costs, such as warehousing and stockout costs. Therefore, in 
order to avoid them, supplier firms will promote sales (in first instance), and 
consequently reduce the level of inventories, by extending trade credit to customer 
firms. From this point of view, it is expected a positive relation between inventory 
and trade receivables.  
 
Additionally, since some firms have less flexibility in their choice of purchasing 
methods, particularly small firms (e.g., Fazel, 1997), some opt more frequently for 
methods that require higher levels of inventories1. Thus, considering that credit 
conceived by suppliers imply a inventory shift from them to customer firms; small 
firms facing higher inventory costs at the margin, will show lower accounts payable. 
This way, and in line with Bougheas et al. (2009), it is expected a negative relation 
between inventory and accounts payable. 
 
II) CHANGES IN RISK PROFILE, PROFITABILITY, LIQUIDITY POSITION AND BANK ACCESS 
The study includes the “𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘” variable, measure the firm’s probability of 
insolvency, to assess the credit quality of a firm that gives it access to formal credit. 
This variable will regard most the theoretical concept and the results considered by 
Bastos and Pindado (2013), which used probability of insolvency (PI) as a proxy for 
credit risk; than the similar variable considered by Bougheas et al. (2009). 
  
The decision to extend trade credit terms must consider the trade-off between 
increased credit risk and enlarged income from sales. A seller that allows customers 
to delay cash payments in order to promote sales exposes a large proportion of assets 
                                                
1 For example, the Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) purchasing option, which requires more inventories 
than Just-in-Time (JIT) (Bougheas et al., 2009). This last option might be difficult to implement in small 
firms since they suffer several limitations (e.g., limited staffing and material resources, and reduced 
bargaining power with customers, suppliers and financial institutions). 
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to the threat that some portion of the receivables may never be collected. In other 
words, when a seller extends trade credit, he is assuming a credit risk. Therefore, 
when a customer goes bankrupt, due to marketable situations, which influence 
customer’s ability to regulate their accounts payable; it is likely to create not only a 
financial distress for credit supplier (bad debts) but also the loss of an important 
customer relationship.  
 
Relatively to demand side, trade credit is most preferred by firms most likely to 
default. Risky-firms, i.e., firms with high probability of insolvency, which are 
incapable of raise internal liquidity and unable to obtain funds from financial 
markets, rely proportionally more on expensive financing from the suppliers in order 
to maintain operations and more importantly, to ensure own survival.  
 
From this perspective, similarly to Bougheas et al. (2009) predictions, it is not 
possible to determine the sign of accounts receivable. However, it is probable that 
this explanatory variable will have positive coefficient relatively to accounts payable 
(e.g., Bastos and Pindado, 2013). 
 
Another dimension of trade credit is firm's ability to generate cash internally, 
which is measured by the net funds provided by operations. Thus, “𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡” (balance 
sheet item) is set out as a proxy to this variable. An obvious expectation is that firms 
with high margin, i.e., with sales higher than variable costs, have an incentive to 
make additional sales, because the next unit sold will generate an extra profit. Thus, 
more profitable firms will subsidize the low quality customers, through trade credit 
extension, in order to promote the sell of additional units (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 
1997; Bougheas et al., 2009). 
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Regarding accounts payable, profitable firms will acquire trade credit more easily 
from their suppliers (Bougheas et al., 2009). However, if there is a pecking-order 
behaviour involved in firms’ financing, firms with more internally generated 
resources will prefer to use these resources to finance investments instead of more 
expensive external finance (Myers and Majluf, 1984). If this proves to be an 
observable behaviour, profitability and accounts payable will be negatively 
correlated (Petersen and Rajan, 1997).  
 
Therefore, the sign of the “𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡” variable in the AP regression is considered to 
be uncertain. With basis on price-discrimination motive, a positive relation between 
profitability and accounts receivable could be expected. 
 
A firm's holding of liquid assets (𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦), which include cash and other short-
term securities; has also been used on literature as explanatory variable (e.g.: 
Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Love, Preve and Sarria-Allende, 2007; Cuñat, 2007).  
 
According to Bougheas et al. (2009), the inventory management motive justifies, 
once again, a firm’s trade credit usage. Due to the fact that firms with a liquidity 
deficit cannot hold inventories, firms are incentivized to increase liquid reserves 
through increased trade credit extension. On the demand side, in order to protect 
themselves from external shocks, firms may refrain from offering trade credit to 
their customers when they target a higher liquidity goal. Because of this, the authors 
have predicted a negative relationship between liquid assets and both accounts 
receivable and payable. 
 
However, according to Van Horne and Wachowicz (2008:211), traditional 
prescription in corporate finance is to adopt a matching approach, i.e., firms should 
finance short-term needs with short-term funds, and long-term needs with long-term 
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funds. One would expect, therefore, is that firms with more liquidity should have a 
higher demand for accounts payable. Additionally, in line with Schwartz (1974), firms 
with more liquidity are in a better position to provide trade credit to their 
customers. In this case, liquidity and trade receivables would be positively related. 
 
In short, due to the various conjunctures that allows the ”𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦” variable, the 
relationship of accounts receivable and accounts payable with a firm liquidity 
position is stated as indeterminate. 
 
Finally, “𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘” variable, which measures short-term debt, was included in this 
study because firm's use of trade credit relies heavily on their use of bank loans 
(Bougheas et al., 2009). The focus on short-term debt for bank credit is because 
short-term loans are more likely to be affected by exogenous monetary shocks 
compared to long-term debt (Yang, 2011). 
 
 Lines of bank credit are generally revolving credit secured by a portion of a firm's 
accounts receivable. According with Klapper (2006), this possibility appears to be a 
powerful tool in providing financing to high-risk informationally opaque firms such as 
SME (Berger and Undell, 1998), since they can help to qualify firms for a loan. In this 
case, a high-quality list of trade customers will incentivize lenders to make a positive 
decision about financing firm's working capital needs. In this case, according with 
Bougheas et al. (2009), it is predictable that accounts receivable will be positively 
related to bank loans i.e. they are compliments. 
 
Upon trade credit debt, short-term bank loan substitutes for accounts payable. If 
pecking-order behaviour is in the basis of credit demand decisions, firms who can 
borrow from financial institutions will have lower accounts payable because trade 
credit is more expensive than bank loans. This alternative source of finance is then 
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particularly important for small firms, who tend to face credit rationing more often 
(e.g., Petersen and Rajan 1997; Wilner 2000; Nilsen 2002; Wilson and Summers 2002; 
Bougheas et al., 2009). Thus, under the substitution hypothesis, it would be expected 
a negative relation between bank credit and accounts payable. 
 
However, under the complementary hypothesis, bank credit is positively related 
with accounts payable, meaning that firms would be using two sources of financing 
simultaneously, one of which is more expensive than other. Although it might seem 
paradoxical, if firms did not use trade credit, then information from the seller could 
not be conveyed to the bank, and the last one would not be willing to lend (Biais and 
Gollier, 1997; Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004). 
 
In this case, according with Bougheas et al. (2009) predictions, the sign of 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘!" 
variable for accounts payable cannot be precisely determined, since it can either be 
positive or negative. 
 
III) CRISIS AND TRADE CREDIT 
Trade credit study, as an important source of finance for firms, during periods of 
financial crisis becomes an extremely important topic to analyse (Meltzer, 1960; 
Nilsen, 2002; Love et al., 2007; Yang 2011; Coulibaly, Sapriza and Zlate, 2013; Bastos 
and Pindado 2013), since the recent global economic crisis of 2008-09 severely hit 
European economies, particularly some countries with high sovereign debt, and 
therefore more vulnerable to external risks; such as Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Italy 
and Spain. 
 
The spread of economic difficulties between countries and financial difficulties 
among businesses, known as contagion effect of credit (Weber and Giesecke, 2006), 
affected the liquidity of banks (e.g., difficulties in maintaining regulatory minimum 
 24 
ratios and increased bad debts); having led the financial institutions to diminish the 
loan activity. Consequently, a large number of companies have been driven to 
extinction (Coulibaly et al., 2013; Ferrando and Mullier, 2013). In this context, given 
that on major purpose of this investigation is to test the effect of trade credit 
contagion as a consequence of financial contagion between financial intermediaries; 
the study include a 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 dummy, similarly to Bastos and Pindado (2013).  
 
Considering that economies are linked, and consequently firms are linked by their 
trade and investments partnerships; during a financial crisis a credit contagion effect 
occurs through two main channels: reduction in demand (trade channel), and the 
deterioration in financing conditions (investment channel). At aggregate level, the 
decline in real economic activity coincided with a market slowdown in private credit 
growth - during banking distress, panicked depositors withdraw their bank deposits. 
At the firm level, the decline in sales was coincident with a drop in their external 
financing. This subtraction that firms suffered on their liquidity was higher than firms 
could generate internally, thus they were forced to finance production, inventories 
and sales in part through trade credit (Coulibaly et al., 2013). 
 
However, with basis on Bastos and Pindado (2013) findings, a credit contagion 
effect also occurs in the trade credit channel. As firms sell and buy on credit, those 
firms with higher levels of accounts receivable, that are not succeed in collecting 
them in time from their customers, are forced to postpone payments to their 
suppliers, with the aim of surviving. Thus, in crisis periods, not only firm's 
characteristics determine trade credit policies, but also a probable credit contagion 
cascading effect arises from the fact that supplier firms can act in exactly the same 
way with their respective suppliers, as a natural reaction of the supplier to customer 
firm’s actions. In this context, according with the authors, it is expected a positive 
influence of 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 on accounts payable.   
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Although they do not study the effects regarding accounts receivable, indeed is 
quite obvious which signal this variable present relatively to 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 dummy. Since 
after the crisis hits the market, customers stop making payments (at least 
temporarily) to suppliers, trade credit will accumulate until either the suppliers take 
the write-downs or the customers resume payments. Thus, an increase on accounts 
receivable is expectable, even if that result is involuntary or forced. The prediction 
of a positive relationship between accounts receivable and 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 dummy is in line 
with Yang (2011) results. 
 
Summarizing, in a general point of view, it is expected that during periods of 
financial recessions, due to the existence of a trade credit cascading effect between 
customer firms and supplier firms; the trade credit to become a relatively more 
important means of finance for firms, especially smaller firms - traditionally the 
more credit-constrained. 
 
Table 1 presents a summary of the independent variables to be tested, and the 
sign of the expected relation with these dependent variables. 
 
Table 1 








Stocks + - 
Profit + +/- 
Risk +/- + 
Liquidity +/- +/- 
Bank + +/- 





4. Data, empirical model and method 
 
This section presents the data, the theoretical model (based on the research 
hypotheses), and the adopted analysis method of the relationship between 
theoretical constructs and observed reality. 
 
4.1. Data 
To test the hypotheses proposed in the previous section, this investigation uses 
firm data obtained from SABI2, a database provided by Bureau Van Dijk, which 
comprises general information of the financial statements of Iberian companies. 
 
Since the Portuguese business consists mostly for small or medium sized firms 
(SME)3, this study analyses the Portuguese SME firms, which operate according to the 
Portuguese Classification of Economic Activities (CAE) in manufacturing industry (CAE 
C) 4. The sector CAE C was chosen because the use of trade credit in this sector is 
more expressive comparing to other sectors  (e.g., services sector - Blasio, 2005; 
Ferrando and Mullier, 2013). 
 
The time period to study covers the years 2000 to 2009. This timeframe allows 
analysing the international financial crisis that occurred in 2008 and affected the 
Portuguese economy, and consequently SMEs. The study ends in 2009 because in 
                                                
2 SABI (Iberian Balance sheet Analysis System) provides balance sheets information of more than 1.25 
million domestic and more than 500,000 Portuguese companies. 
3 According to the European Commission Recommendation, to be considered a small firm, two from the 
tree criteria need to be respected: (i) having less than 250 employees and (ii) having an annual business 
volume not exceeding €50 million or assets not exceeding €43 million. 
4 The Portuguese Classification of Economic Activities (CAE), available since 1 January 2008 in its version 
3, is a system of classification and clustering of economic activities in statistical units of goods and 
services. 
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2010, occurs changes in accounting standards, i.e., the Sistema de Normalização 
Contabilística was introduced, which could bias the results. 
 
To select the sample, several restrictions were imposed: (i) firms could not have 
zero sales and zero total assets, meaning that firms should report any activity, and 
(ii) data should be available at least for three years. 
 
4.2. Empirical Model 
Following Bougheas et al. (2009), to analyse the response of both trade credit 
extended and received to changes in the cost of inventories and to changes in firm’s 
characteristics such as risk, profitability and liquidity, the empirical models proposed 
are as follows: 
 
AR!" =   𝛼! + 𝛼!𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠!" +    𝛼!
!
!!! 𝜒!" +   𝜀!",                                                        (1) 
AP!" =   𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠!" +    𝛽!
!
!!! 𝜒!" +   𝜇!",                                                         (2) 
 
As a proxy for the dependent variables trade credit supply and trade credit 
demand, the study defines accounts receivable (AR) and accounts payable (AP), 
respectively; observable from the balance sheet items trade debtors and creditors, 
for the company 𝑖 in year 𝑡. 
 
The coefficients 𝛼! and 𝛽! are the parameters that will be estimated. Both trade 
credit extended and received are explained by the same independent variables (𝜒!"): 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠!", the total stock of inventories (stocks, raw materials, work in progress, by-
products and finished products); 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡!", is the firm´s profit (or loss) for the period; 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦!", represents firm’s gross liquid assets (cash, bank deposits, and other 
current assets excluding accounts receivable); 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘!", which represents short-term 
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bank loans; and 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘!" measures the probability of insolvency. With the exception of 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘!", all variables are scaled by total sales. Finally, 𝜀!" and µμ!"  are the error term. 
 
To measure 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘!" we use the model proposed by Begley, Ming e Watts (1996), as 
an extension of the Altman´s (1968) Z-score5 model, defined as follow: 
 
𝑍 − score!" =   0.104𝜒! +   1.01𝜒! +   0.106𝜒! +   0.003𝜒! +   0.169𝜒! 
 
where 𝜒! is working capital divided by total assets; 𝜒! is retained earnings divided by 
total assets; 𝜒! is earnings before interest and taxes (net operating profits) divided 
by total assets; 𝜒! is the ratio of market value of equity to the book value of total 
debt; and 𝜒! is total sales divided by total assets.  
 
Therefore, the previous models in the equations (1) and (2) assume, respectively, 
































+   𝜇!",    (4) 
 
In order to check whether the usage of trade credit is sensitive to differences in 
the size within the sample, which comprises micro, small and medium size firms, the 
study uses the “𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒” variable, defined as the natural logarithm of firm’s real assets.  
 
Since Bougheas et al., (2009) postulate that the holding costs decrease not only 
with the level of inventories, but also with the size of the firm (Fazel, 1997), the 
                                                
5 The Z-score is the best-known financial distress test. It is widely used by financial institutions, which 
implies that it serves as a reference indicator for external creditors to judge the soundness of the firm’s 
investment policy, those that seldom are followed by Rating Agencies (Aktas et al., 2012). 
 30 
“𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒” and “𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠” variables are then interacted to control for these differences. In 
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+   β!Size!" +   𝜇!" ,                                                                                              (6) 
 
To move forward in the examination of how accounts receivable and payable 
responds to changes in the cost of inventories, profitability, risk and liquidity, this 
investigation performs an estimation to find out whether the most recent financial-
crisis period in any way influenced trade credit usage.  
 
Thus, following Bastos and Pindado (2013), the model adds a dummy variable 
named 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠, which assumes the value of one in the year 2008, and zero otherwise, 
in order to verify if a credit contagion effect occurred during the financial crisis. 
Additionally, to verify how periods of financial crisis influences the relation between 
a firm’s insolvency risk and trade credit usage, it is reported an interaction between 
the dummy variable 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 and the independent variable “𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘”. 
 
Finally, the empirical estimation model below models trade credit received and 
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+   β!Size!" +   𝛽!𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 +   𝛽!𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘!" +   𝜇!" ,                                       (8) 
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 4.3. Method 
Since the sample data covers the period 2000-2009, and thus, for the same firm 
there will be several observations; this study employs Panel Data method, which 
allows to examine each firm as longitudinal and as well as across-sectional time-
series data. 
 
This method proves to be the most appropriate because, since it significantly 
increases the number of degrees of freedom due to the larger number of 
observations obtained; it ensures more efficiency to the estimates and allows 
avoiding the two main problems (Wooldridge, 2002): (i) the unobservable 
heterogeneity (equal variances of residues), and (ii) the endogeneity (correlation of 
the explanatory variables with the error term).  
 
The first problem - unobservable heterogeneity, is a relevant problem when we 
analyse trade credit, since its usage depends on the firms' characteristics. Thus, in 
order to avoid the bias of the coefficients, the study models this heterogeneity, 
assuming an individual effect (𝜂!). Accordingly, the idiosyncratic error components in 
the models above - 𝜀!" and 𝜇!", will be split into three components. First, 𝜂! stands 
for the already cited firm-specific effect (e.g., the propensity to the risk). Second, 
𝒹! is the temporary dummy variables that change overt time (time-specific effect), 
but that are equal for all firms in each period considered, and that can not be 
controlled by them (e.g.: macroeconomic influences, as suggested by Meltzer, 1960 
and Nilsen, 2002). Finally, 𝜈!" is the random disturbance. In the baseline equations 
(1) and (2), the idiosyncratic error is then: 
 
AR!" =   𝛼! + 𝛼!𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠!" +    𝛼!
!
!!! 𝜒!" +   𝜂! +   𝒹! +   𝜈!" , 
AP!" =   𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠!" +    𝛽!
!
!!! 𝜒!" +   𝜂! +   𝒹! +   𝜈!" , 
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The second problem is the possible endogeneity of the regressors, i.e., the 
likelihood of the dependent variables to explain some of the independent variables. 
Particularly, suppliers tend to match their terms for trade credit offered (AR) with 
that of trade-credit received (AP). Hence, a double direction exists in those variables 
(e.g., on the one hand, firms might define their trade credit policies and, after that, 
try to negotiate terms of credit with suppliers; or, on the other hand, firms buy 
goods from suppliers and then, depending on the suppliers' terms of credit, they 
decide their own credit policies).  
 
Therefore, in order to provide evidence of the robustness of the results to 
different estimation methods of panel data methodology, the regressions were 
estimated using the Least Squares Method (Pooled OLS), the Fixed-Effects model (FE) 
and the Random-Effects model (RE). 
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5. Empirical results 
 
In this section the baseline results for the main testable hypotheses are discussed. 
In the univariate analysis, the average ratio of trade credit offered and received is 
compared by year and size. Afterward, a multivariate analysis is performed, firstly to 
test whether AR and AP are determined by changes in inventory costs and firm’s 
characteristics; and secondly, to find out how the most recent financial-crisis period 
influenced, in any way, the trade credit usage. 
 
5.1. Univariate analysis 




Univariate Analysis: Descriptive Statistics. 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Accounts Receivable (AR) 62182 0.3302 1.8905 1.16e-06 278.5601 
Accounts Payable (AP) 66934 0.2615 3.4815 0 651.8727 
Stocks 69169 0.8016 0.6346 -0.007874 136.654 
Risk 66477 0.2471 5.3062 -1254.973 184.0312 
Profit 74540 -0.1421 20.6278 -5121.906 218.7473 
Liquidity 68213 0.1498 4.1508 -0.5458 793.0449 
Bank 48750 0.2364 9.3362 -401.1249 1878.393 
Size 74541 6.7805 1.2906 -2.5383 13.14003 
 
In average, the amount of accounts receivable (33,02%) is greater than the 
amount of accounts payable (26,15%). Thus, is obvious that in general terms, firms 
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extend more trade credit than borrow. Inventories play a greater role on firm’s 
assets (80%). The average value of risk, profit and liquidity variables is 24.71, 14.21 
and 14.98, respectively. Just profit variable is negative, meaning that in average, 
Portuguese SME firms report negative operational results. Firms of the sample are 
highly dependent on bank financing (mean value of bank variable is 23,64%). Size is a 
natural logarithm of total assets. 
 
Table 3 shows the average amount of trade credit granted and received in respect 
to Portuguese SME firms for a period of ten years from 2000 to 2009. From 2003 to 
2004 there was a large growth of both trade credit offered and received, displaying 
until 2009 the higher scores for the firms in the sample. 
 
Table 3 
Univariate Analysis: Trade Credit Offered and Received by Year. 
 
Year Accounts Receivable (AR) 
Accounts 
Payable (AP) 
2000 25,28% 21,97% 
2001 26,69% 22,18% 
2002 27,42% 21,43% 
2003 29,61% 22,84% 
2004 35,08% 25,91% 
2005 34,84% 27,18% 
2006 31,30% 28,02% 
2007 35,83% 27,58% 
2008 34,40% 23,57% 
2009 32,69% 28,08% 
 
Notes: The percentages reported correspond to the mean values for both dependent variables. 
 
From 2005 to 2006, accounts receivable suffered a sharp drop (-3,54pp), followed 
by a great increase in 2007 (4,53pp). Once the accounts receivable are scaled by 
sales, its behaviour from 2005 to 2006 is justified as a subsequent aftermath of the 
2003 economic recession; to which Portugal was unable to contract the negative 
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effects until 2006. After that, Portuguese exports increased from 2006 to 2007 
(GPEARI, 2009). Therefore, considering that the vast majority of exports in 2007 
were carried out by SMEs (82.9% - IAPMEI, 2008), this fact is a potential factor to 
explain the consequent increase in accounts receivable between 2006 and 2007. 
Accounts Payable also recorded a sharp fall of 4,01pp in 2008, and an increase of 
4,51pp in 2009. The justification is the global economic crisis, which had a negative 
impact on business investment6. Many firms, which had at the time access to their 
own resources or bank loans to finance their customers, began to reduce credit 
granted to other firms. 
 
Figure 1 allows visualizing this interpretation. In Figure 2, the same results are 
reported, but now, the average amount of accounts receivable and payable is scaled 
by total assets (the results were previously scaled by total sales). 
 
Figure 1 




                                                
6 The global economic crisis began to feel more pronounced in the Portuguese economy in 2008, having 






















Figure 2 shows that AR and AP variables, scaled by total assets, report a behaviour 
much more linear than when they are scaled by total sales. These results confirm 
earlier conclusions, that is, dependent variables are subject to temporal changes 
(e.g.: macroeconomic effects), which could skew the results if the methodology 
panel data were not used. Since this allows you to control these effects, it is proven 
that the chosen methodology is the best option for this study. 
 
Table 4 provides the distribution of trade credit offered and received by size. 
Although medium firms, i.e., firms above 3rd quartile of total assets, take more trade 
credit than grant, the difference is not significant (1.11pp), and therefore, it can be 
said that in a general way, Portuguese SMEs extend more trade credit than received. 

























Micro 23,60% 15,35% 
Small 35,83% 25,93% 
Medium 34,82% 35,93% 
 
Note: Microenterprises are companies whose total assets are below the 1st quartile of the distribution of 
total assets of all firms considered in the sample. Small businesses hold total assets whose value is 
between the 1st and 3rd quartile. Finally, medium-sized firms are those with total assets above the 3rd 
quartile. 
 
Firms that resort less to trade credit are those that the total assets are below the 
1st quartile, i.e., small firms. The fact that are the smaller firms the ones who less 
resort to trade credit may be justified by the lack of confidence by their suppliers in 
providing finance, since they might feel that will not be able to have the return of 
that same credit. 
 
The firms with total assets between the 1st and 3rd quartile are the ones that 
extend more trade credit. This is in line with the substitution hypothesis. As the size 
of a company increases, these firms no longer need to resort to trade credit as the 
main source of funding, whereas are themselves, by having easy access to alternative 
and cheaper sources of funding; who now assumes the role of financing with smaller 
companies. 
 
5.2. Multivariate analysis 
As suggested by the Hausman (1978) test, if the effects are uncorrelated with the 
independent variables, then the fixed effects and random effects estimates should 
not be significantly different. Thus, once the test rejected the null hypothesis for 
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each regression, the study uses the fixed-effects models. The model controls the 
macroeconomic impact by including 10-year dummies variables, which correspond to 
the years of 2000 to 2009. For reasons of brevity, the results are not reported but are 
available on request to the author. 
 
The multivariate analysis is reported in 3 tables. Table 5 reports the relationship 
between AR and the independent variables, whereas table 6 reports the results for 
AP. Column 1 in both tables presents regression results ignoring the influence of 
“𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒”, while the remaining columns include “𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒” as an additional variable (column 
2), as an interaction term with “𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠” (column 3), and both variables in column 4.  
 
The results from table 5, column 1, show that “𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠” variable have a positive 
and statistically significant coefficient (at 1% level), indicating that when firms have 
higher inventories, they tend to extend more trade credit. Once that higher 
inventory may reflect unintended accumulation of unsold goods, firms facing 
declining demand will have an incentive to promote overall sales through increased 
sales on credit and, consequently, an incentive to hold fewer inventories. This result 
relies significantly on Wilson and Summers (2002) argument that firms extend sales 
by offering goods on account in the first instance.  
 
Moreover, it is consistent with Ferris (1981) and Emery (1987) transactions cost 
theory of trade credit. If sellers are subject to a high degree of uncertainty with 
respect to the timing and magnitude of orders, they will carry high inventory. In this 
situation, the buyer and seller have a common incentive to use trade credit in order 
to reduce the storage costs of good and the cost of maintaining liquidity
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Table 5 
Multivariate analysis: Relation between trade credit offered and firm’s characteristics. 
This table shows the estimation results of the equations (3) and (5). 
 
Accounts Receivable (AR) 
  1 2 3 4 
Stocks 0.1127* 0.1103* 0.1084* 0.1036* 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Stocks*Size     -0.0077* -0.0113* 
   (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Risk -0.0009 -0.0160* -0.0063 -0.0269* 
 (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) 
Profit 0.0336* 0.0330* 0.0247* 0.0199* 
 
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
Liquidity -0.2034* -0.2092* -0.1529* -0.1366* 
 (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0056) (0.0056) 
Bank -0.0022** -0.0029* -0.0064* -0.0091* 
 (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) 





Constant	   0.1700* 2.3175* 0.2063* 2.8004* 
	  	   (0.0256) (0.0896) (0.0257) (0.0918) 
Observations 44848 44848 44848 44848 
Hausman Test 3422.26 4064.40 3432.02 4461.75 
 
Notes: All specifications are estimated using fixed-effects method. Test statistics and standard errors (in 
parentheses) are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Time dummies, although not reported, were 




Multivariate analysis: Relation between trade credit received and firm’s characteristics.  
This table shows the estimation results of the equations (4) and (6). 
 
Accounts Payable (AP) 
  1 2 3 4 
Stocks -0.0106* -0.0108* 0.0274* 0.0251* 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Stocks*Size     0.0181* 0.0171* 
    (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Risk -0.0281* -0.0678* -0.0314* -0.0494* 
  (0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0046) (0.0046) 
Profit -0.0680* -0.0736* -0.0670* -0.0696* 
  (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
Liquidity 0.4148* 0.4021* 0.3006* 0.3013* 
  (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0040) (0.0039) 
Bank -0.0200* -0.0255* -0.0273* -0.0294* 
  (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Size   -0.7577*   -0.3462* 
    (0.0154)   (0.0139) 
Constant	   0.1836* 5.4208* 0.0829* 2.4815* 
	  	   (0.0338) (0.1116) (0.0286) (0.1002) 
Observations 47387 47387 47387 47387 
Hausman Test 170.62 4064.40 3432.02 4461.75 
 
Notes: All specifications are estimated using fixed-effects method. Test statistics and standard errors (in 
parentheses) are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Time dummies, although not reported, were 
always included as regressors. The 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance are indicated by *, ** and ***, 
respectively. 
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This result from AR regression to the variable “𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠”, considering exclusively a 
sample of SME firms; coincide with those of Bougheas et al. (2009), which use a 
sample of both large and small firms; only when they consider the size effect in the 
analysis, i.e., when they consider that the use of trade credit may differ from 
companies of different sizes.  
 
Inventory management motive is then particularly important for small and medium 
enterprises, since, as the results concerning “𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒” variable show (table 5, column 
2), as firm size decreases, AR increases. This reinforces the idea that as the size of 
the firm decreases, inventories play a greater role in the firm’s decision to extend AR 
(Bougheas et al., 2009). Moreover, this result has even more relevance when 
“𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠” and “𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒” are interacted (table 5, column 3). The findings show that small 
firms, within in the SME firm’s sample, are more influenced by the trade-off between 
current credit sales and future cash sales because, according to Bougheas et al. 
(2009) postulate, their holding costs are higher. 
 
Finally, the results of “𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠” variable in AP regression (table 6, column 1) report 
a negative coefficient, significant at the level of 1%. This result is also in line with 
Bougheas et al. (2009), and suggests that firms with higher inventories levels have 
lower accounts payable. As seen previously when the hypotheses of the study were 
formulated, when firms accept credit from their suppliers, their inventory levels 
increase and consequently, the costs of these inventories are transferred from 
suppliers to customers. Because the cost of inventories increase when firm size 
decreases, i.e., small firms incur higher inventories costs than large companies; 
then, SME firms have a great incentive to decrease the amount of trade credit 
received from suppliers. This result provides additional support to the inventory 
management motive, previously reported, for the use of trade credit by Portuguese 
SME firms. 
 42 
The “𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡” variable (table 5, column 1) has a positive and significant effect on 
AR, meaning that Portuguese SME with more internally generated resources will tend 
to offer more trade credit to their customers. This result, in line with Bougheas et al. 
(2009), can be interpreted as more profitable firms, which may face a major problem 
with respect to variability of demand for their product, to having a greater need to 
channel the extra profit to accounts receivable for inventory management purpose. 
 
Earlier, Petersen and Rajan (1997) also report a positive coefficient to gross profit 
margin. According to them, if firms have the ability to discriminate between buyers 
through the use of trade credit, i.e., grant cash discounts to prompt payment 
customers and charge higher prices for customers who delay the payment deadline; 
they will have a greater propensity to give support in the long term to trading 
partners with high financing need, in order to benefit from a profit margin that may 
get in future sales. 
 
Concerning AP regression (table 6, column 1), the result reported to “𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡” 
variable is not in concordance with Bougheas et al. (2009). In their article, they find 
profitability positively related to accounts payable, i.e., more credit worthy receive 
more credit from their suppliers. However, to the Portuguese SME sample, the 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level coefficient, which is the same 
found by Petersen and Rajan (1997); calls in question the extreme relevance of 
pecking-order behaviour involved in firms’ financing (Myers and Majluf, 1984). At the 
time a firm's ability to generate internal funds increases, its tendency to buy on 
credit decreases. This happens because firms prioritize internal funding instead of 
more expensive external finance such as, in this case, the accounts payable. Another 




Relatively to the “𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦” variable, the results reported on table 5, column 1, 
indicate that liquid assets have a negative and significant influence on the volume of 
sales on credit, confirming Bougheas et al. (2009) and Petersen and Rajan (1997) 
findings. The explanation is quite intuitive: firms with higher level of liquidity extend 
less trade credit than the less liquid ones. Low liquid firms cannot hold inventories 
due to their high costs, and thus, they are lead to offer trade credit. Alternatively, 
we could have in this case a reverse causality issue: high liquid firms might want to 
preserve it, i.e., they might want to protect themselves against negative external 
shocks. 
 
Purchases on account (table 6, column 1) in the other hand, have a positive 
relationship with holding of liquid assets, as also confirmed by Bougheas et al. 
(2009). On the basis of the matching approach to financing (Van Horne and 
Wachowicz, 2008:211), this result can be interpreted as trade credit to being 
primarily used by high-liquid firms to finance short-term assets (Deloof and Jegers, 
1999). Specifically in the sample of this study, initial terms of payment are usually 
longer, the availability of discounts is more limited and often there are no penalties 
for late payments (Marotta, 2005). Therefore, firms with high cash holding do not use 
it to make purchases on cash, relying on their suppliers to finance purchases. This 
suggests a strategic use of trade credit as a continuous source of financing. 
 
Another useful explanation relies on Ferris (1981) cash management tool motive 
for trade credit. By allowing the accumulation of several payments into one, trade 
credit decreases the number of settlements and, consequently, lowers the costs of 
intermediation. Thus, fast collections combined with slow disbursements, will result 




Since the “𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘” variable displays a negative coefficient (table 5 and 6, column 
1) relatively to both AR and AP regressions, is possible to observe within Portuguese 
SME firms, a substitution effect between trade credit and bank credit.  
 
With respect to accounts receivable, firms who can secure enough credit from 
institutional sources have lower accounts payable, which means that trade credit is 
used when bank loans are not obtained. Petersen and Rajan (1997), Nilsen (2002) and 
Bougheas et al. (2009), even using different data sets and time periods, come to a 
similar conclusion. This result is clearly indicative that trade credit is more expensive 
than bank loans and fits in nicely with the pecking order hypothesis. When it comes 
to accounts receivable, firms having access to bank finance does not pass this on as 
accounts receivable to their customers. This may be due to the fact that, in one 
hand, the higher the level of debt, the greater the likelihood of default by the 
customer. On the other hand, supplier companies with higher costs of access to bank 
financing, will have a lower capacity to grant trade credit to their customers (Cuñat, 
2007). This result is different from the one reported by Bougheas et al. (2009). 
 
Finally, the estimates for the “𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘” variable (table 5, column 1) show a negative 
coefficient relatively to AR regression, which is consistent with Bougheas et al. 
(2009), however is not significant. It only becomes significant (at the 1% level) when 
the effect of size is considered (table 5, column 2). Since firms also have to meet 
their own obligations with respect to their suppliers and external creditors; low 
credit-rated firms, such as those with a high probability of insolvency, and thus more 
riskier; do not take the risk to face a financial distress when extending trade credit 
to customers because, that attitude brings itself more exposition to a possible 
constrained customers who may not pay on time. Thus, Portuguese SME firms, who 
are considerably high-risky firms (the mean of the variable Risk is 24,7), in order to 
avoid a higher risk of liquidation; have lower accounts receivable. This means that 
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size (small) affects the risk (high) of a firm, and that will after affect the extension 
of trade credit (lower accounts receivable). 
 
Concerning AP regression, the “𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘” variable (table 6, column 1) shows a 
negative coefficient. This is in line with Bougheas et al. (2009), however, is contrary 
to what was expected from formulated hypotheses. Firms delaying the repayment 
period established with the supplier receive “negative points” relatively to their 
credit quality. Thus, the increased concern of suppliers about the customers 
repayment ability are lowering the capacity of more risky firms to access to credit 
from suppliers. This can also have serious consequences relatively to access to formal 
credit via financial institutions, once accounts payable are a positive sign to banks 
(Bias and Gollier, 1997). 
 
Regarding now table 7, which reports the response of AR and AP during periods of 
financial crisis, column 6 in both tables display regression results concerning 
equations (5) and (6) presented in the previous section, considering exclusively the 
influence of 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠, and column 7 includes the interaction term 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘. This 
last table check for empirical evidence of credit contagion occurring in periods of 
financial crisis. 
 
The 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 dummy (table 7, column 6) shows to both AR and AP regressions a 




Multivariate analysis: Influence of the financial-crisis on trade credit usage. 


































Notes: All specifications are estimated using fixed-effects method. Test statistics and standard errors (in 
parentheses) are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Time dummies, although not reported, 
were always included as regressors. The 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance are indicated by *, ** and 
***, respectively.
  Accounts Receivable Accounts Payable 
  6 7 6 7 
Stocks 0.1042* 0.1042* 0.0253* 0.0253* 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Stocks*Size -0.0106* -0.0107* 0.0171* 0.0171* 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Risk -0.0264* -0.0269* -0.0493* -0.0496* 
 (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0046) (0.0046) 
Profit 0.0204* 0.0204* -0.0697* -0.0697* 
 (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
Liquidity -0.1403* -0.1402* 0.3012* 0.3012* 
 (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0039) (0.0039) 
Bank -0.0089* -0.0089* -0.0294* -0.0294* 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Size -0.3474* -0.3496* -0.3323* -0.3333* 
 (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0137) (0.0137) 
Crisis 0.0280* 0.0128 0.0248** 0.0177 
 (0.0106) (0.0126) (0.0119) (0.0136) 
Crisis*Risk   0.0617**   0.0298 
    0.0275   (0.0277) 
Constant 2.7503* 2.7662* 2.4203* 2.4279* 
  (0.0884) (0.0886) (0.0963) (0.0966) 
Observations 44848 44848 47387 47387 
Hausman Test 4268.93 4287.11 4268.93 4287.11 
 47 
On the supply side of trade credit (AR regression), the results of this 
𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠  variable show that credit constraints, caused by the financial crisis in the year 
of 2008, led firms to postpone payments to suppliers to avoid an increase in their 
liquidity risk. This might have happened because, these firms could not be receiving 
payment for their sales made on credit, and they could not have other source of 
finance (the negative coefficient of variable “𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘” confirms that firms use more 
trade credit when bank credit is not available), being forced to increase accounts 
receivable, almost involuntarily. 
 
On the demand side instead (AP regression), 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 variable results proves that a 
contagion effect exists during periods of financial crisis, firstly from the financial 
channel into the trade channel, i.e., from banks into firms, in form of credit 
rationing, which forced firms to increase credit from the suppliers (the negative 
coefficient of 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘!" variable in table 6, column 1, worsened when 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 dummy 
was introduced - see table 7, column 6, AP regression); and secondly within the own 
trade channel, i.e., came from customer firms, who delayed collection from their 
own customers; to supplier firms, who consequently were forced to postpone 
payment to their own suppliers.  
 
This result does not allow a comparison with the ones of Bastos and Pindado 
(2013) because the authors' model does not include an analysis on the effects of the 
𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 dummy on this dependent variable (AP). However, Yang (2011) confirms these 
results that both accounts increase in breakout period. In fact, their results show 
that it is during this period that the accounts receivable and payable more increase, 
relative to the total period considered. The explanation for this increase in short-
term trade credit during the crisis is straight assignable to the effect of contagion. 
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Column 7 of table 6 shows that economic shocks enhance the positive relation 
between trade credit extended and firm's risk (the interaction variable 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 
is significant at the level of 5%). Relatively to trade credit received, the interaction 
term displays a positive coefficient that is not significant. When a customer firm 
experiences liquidity problems and have no alternative sources of credit; the 
capacity to repay on time credit purchases disappears (at least temporarily), and the 
probability of default increases, becoming then a high-risk firm.  
 
In this situation, the results of interaction term, unlike to the conclusion reached 
when “𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘” variable was examined individually; suggest that during periods of 
financial crisis, suppliers grant more credit, even to customer firms that have a high 
credit risk. This occurs because, when those risky customers represent a large share 
on supplier's business portfolio, if their demand for supplier's products cease, the 
supplier's own survival may be jeopardized. Therefore, the contagion effect that 
occurs during periods of financial crisis forces suppliers to grant more trade credit to 
risky customers, more as a financial bailout (almost involuntary), than as a strategy 





The trade credit it is a short-term and informal type of financing, whose terms are 
usually not fixed contractually. It combines the normal business activity of a firm - 
production and sell of goods - with financial intermediation in the form of delayed 
payment. Therefore, the purchaser of goods acts as debtor and the supplier as 
creditor. 
 
The literature on the subject has been examining a number of firm's 
characteristics and the terms in which trade credit it is established; in an attempt to 
explain why firms use this form of financing. However, there is a so diverse set of 
theories explaining this type of credit on different points of view, that is not possible 
to set out a general theory of trade credit.  
 
Accordingly, this study focus the behaviour of accounts receivable and payable, 
used as proxies for both trade credit supply and demand; in the presence of the 
inventory management motive, arisen from the transaction costs theory. In addition, 
the analysis also considers the credit contagion effect, which occurs during periods of 
financial crisis. 
 
The theoretical model of the study, when considering the inventory management 
motive, it is stylized with basis on Bougheas, Mateut and Mizen (2009). When the 
trade credit contagion effect is studied, the investigation relies on de model of 
Bastos and Pindado (2013). Firstly, a firm in the middle of the supply chain, that sees 
his own inventory levels to increase because accepted trade credit from their 
upstream suppliers; and faces uncertain demand for their products, and because of 
that have to hold inventories at a cost; will have, in a first instance, an incentive to 
promote sales through the extension of trade credit to their financially constrained 
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customers, and in a second instance, to reduce costly inventories of finished goods. 
In this first context, firms might face a trade-off between inventories and trade 
credit.  
 
Secondly, because firms sell and buy on credit; those with higher levels of 
accounts receivable, that are not succeed in collecting them in time from their 
customers; are forced to postpone payments to their suppliers, with the aim of 
surviving. Thus, as a natural reaction of the supplier to customer's actions, supplier 
firms will act in exactly the same way with their respective suppliers. In this second 
context, is probable that a trade credit contagion, in cascading effect, arises, and 
that will affect trade credit policies. 
 
Using a panel dataset of Portuguese SME firms, obtained and filtered from SABI 
data base, which contains information on over 400 million companies in the Iberian 
Peninsula; the study provides results for the two major testable variables - stocks of 
inventories and crisis -, and for the control variables such as profitability, risk 
profile, liquidity position and bank access; which refers to firm's characteristics. 
 
The univariate analysis shows that accounts receivable are higher than accounts 
payable. Then, in general, SME firms grant more credit than borrow. They also 
provide evidence that accounts receivable and payable are sensible to temporal 
changes (e.g.: macroeconomic effects); which could skew the results if the 
methodology of panel data were not used. Finally, when analysing trade credit usage 
by size, was evidenced that, as the size increases, also accounts payable increase. 
 
From the multivariate analysis, the results show that inventories have direct 
influence on both trade accounts (receivable and payable). This confirms the 
existence of an inventory management purpose for Portuguese SME firms in providing 
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credit to their customers. Moreover, during financial crisis a trade credit contagion, 
cascade effect; arise on the supply chain, increasing consequently the use of trade 
credit. Specifically, high-risk firms receive more suppliers’ credit due to suppliers 
concern about their customer’s survival. The results reported support the predictions 
and the model of the investigation, as well the main literature related with the focus 
of the study. 
 
The major limitation of this study was related to the fact that the inventory 
management motive is a vein of literature on trade credit studied almost exclusively 
by the discipline of operations management, meaning, a focus on the subject of 
managing inventories a purely operational perspective. As this research is from the 
economic area, i.e., once it is focused on costs perspective, the vast literature 
reported by operations management was not very helpful in this investigation in 
particular. In consequence of these "missing" articles with economic focus on 
inventory management for supply of trade credit, there are few or none papers to 
report within the study sample, data on Portuguese firms. 
 
Given these limitations, it is important that further studies on trade credit would 
concentrate on the impact of inventory management for supply of trade credit. In 
addition, it would be interesting to detail the research for identical entrepreneurial 
subgroups, i.e., to analyse separately small and medium enterprises; or expand the 
research to other sectors (primary and tertiary) or to firms from other countries. For 
example, given the strong trade relations between Portugal and Spain, would be 
appealing to conduct the same study with samples of the two countries, in order to 
be able to test relevant differences.   
 52 
 
